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CONDITIONAL ACCESS TO JUVENILE
COURT PROCEEDINGS: A PRIOR
RESTRAINT OR A VIABLE SOLUTION?
INTRODUCTION
Statutory juvenile laws do not acknowledge an unconditional public'
right of access to juvenile courts.2 In a majority of states, juvenile
hearings are closed to the public and the press? "Confidentiality" is an
important distinguishing factor between juvenile courts and traditional
1. Throughout this Note, the word "public" is used interchangeably with the terms
"press," "news media," "media," and "general public." This Note does not discuss the
First Amendment rights of broadcast media within the juvenile courts; the focus is
strictly on the rights of newspapers and other types of printed media.
2. State courts differ in their opinions of whether there is a qualified right of access
to juvenile proceedings. See, eg., San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social Seres. v.
Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 338-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a First
Amendment right of access does not extend to juvenile delinquency hearings); In re
T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 450 (Ohio 1990) (holding that there is no presumption of open-
ness in juvenile court and that the press has no qualified right of access to these proceed-
ings), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 386 (1990); Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v.
Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1258-59 (R.I. 1982) (holding that because the press has no
constitutional right of access to juvenile proceedings, Rhode Island's statute restricting
access is valid); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Vt. 1981) (concluding that a Vermont
statute mandating closed juvenile proceedings is constitutional). Cf United States v.
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 862 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (noting that the
Supreme Court implied that the public has a right to be informed about the conduct of
judicial proceedings); In re Hughes County, 452 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D. 1990) (holding
that because the press has a qualified right of access to juvenile hearings, the court can
close juvenile proceedings only after balancing the state's interests against the press'
rights); Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577, 580 (S.D. 1987) (concluding
that the juvenile court abused its discretion to bar the media from a transfer hearing
because the court failed to balance the parties' interests properly).
3. See infra note 15 and accompanying text explaining the exception to this rule and
providing the illustrative statutory provisions.
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adjudicatory hearings.4 Restricting press access, however, may violate
a constitutional right to attend court proceedings. Although the
Supreme Court found it implicit in the First Amendment that the press
shall have access to criminal trials,5 it has not addressed the issue of
whether this holding extends to juvenile proceedings.' This lack of
guidance has left states to create their own statutes7 which may poten-
tially infringe upon the press' First Amendment right of access to the
courts.8 Moreover, these statutes may create prior restraint9 problems
by prohibiting the press from freely publishing truthful information
that is of interest to the public. 1
4. See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text discussing the traditional purpose
of the juvenile court and the theories behind confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings.
5. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that an unarticulated right of access is found within the penumbra of the
First Amendment and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, the Constitution protects the press' right to publish public information gath-
ered inside the courtroom. Id. at 575-81. See also infra notes 63-90 and accompanying
text discussing the history of the press' access to adult criminal courts.
The Supreme Court has found several other unenumerated rights embodied within
the Constitution. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (the right of privacy); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (the right to privacy in personal, marriage, family, and sexual deci-
sions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the right to sexual privacy); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the right to privacy in marriage); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (the right of association); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (the right of privacy with respect to childrearing and education); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
6. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text discussing lower courts' reaction to
this lack of guidance.
7. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text, which discusses the different state
statutes that affect access to juvenile proceedings and distinguishes them according to
the type of restrictions placed on the news media.
8. Several scholars have proposed that the public has a fundamental right of access
to the juvenile courts. See generally Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceed-
ings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 101 (1958); Stephan Jonas, Press Access to the Juvenile
Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 287 (1982); Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings,
81 MICH. L. REv. 1540 (1983).
9. A prior restraint is an official order that "chills speech" because it prohibits the
press from publishing certain kinds of information. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 559 (1976). See infra notes 101-111 and accompanying text for a thorough
discussion of prior restraints and the news media.
10. The Supreme Court has held that a state cannot criminally punish a publication
if it truthfully publishes information that was obtained lawfully. Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-06 (1979) (holding that a state cannot prohibit the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol44/iss1/5
JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
This Note questions the constitutionality of statutory juvenile laws
that place restrictions on the press' right to disseminate and publish
information obtained in juvenile courts.11 Part I looks at a variety of
state codes that place restraints on access to juvenile proceedings. Part
II examines criteria that courts have considered when deciding
whether to close or open juvenile hearings. Part III analyzes statutes
that open the juvenile court to members of the press but place speech-
related restraints on what they can divulge and publish. Part IV ad-
dresses the policy reasons why the Supreme Court should address this
issue and proposes model state legislation that aims to protect the First
Amendment rights of the press as well as the Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendment rights of the juvenile delinquent. 2
truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a
newspaper). See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-
42 (1978) (stating that the First Amendment prohibits imposing criminal sanctions on
the news media for divulging or publishing truthful information); Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-97 (1975) (holding that a newspaper may publish the
name of a deceased rape victim if lawfully obtained from records available for public
inspection).
11. This Note is based on the premise that there is no constitutional right of access
to juvenile courts. Once access is granted, however, the press immediately gains a First
Amendment right to publish truthful and lawfully obtained information. Any limita-
tions that hinder the First Amendment right of free speech must be strictly scrutinized
by the courts.
The scope of this Note includes a historical analysis of the "right of access" argu-
ment, and primarily focuses on the conflict between the First Amendment right of free-
dom of speech and the privacy concerns of the juvenile courts.
12. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether juveniles have a
fundamental due process right to keep their hearings private and closed to the public.
Most juvenile courts have jurisdiction over dependency, neglect, and adoption proceed-
ings, as well as status offenses and more violent "adult-like" crimes committed by juve-
nile delinquents. A status offense is an act by a juvenile that would not be illegal if
committed by an adult. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATr, HANDLING
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 20 (1982). Juveniles involved in dependency, neglect,
or adoption proceedings may have a qualified right to a private hearing. In re T.R., 556
N.E.2d 439, 449 (Ohio 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 386 (1990). Juveniles suspected of
status offenses and "adult-like" crimes are not as privileged. For instance, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently upheld a statute that permits juvenile courts to
remain open when a juvenile is charged with murder. News Group Boston, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 568 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Mass. 1991) (upholding MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 1991)). The court held that juveniles who commit heinous
crimes are not a suspect class and, therefore, legislation that opens their transfer hear-
ings to the public will be valid if it is "a rational means to serve a legitimate end." Id. at
603 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985)). See also
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFOR-
MATION POLICY: PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS 18 (1982) [hereinafter
1993]
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I. STATE LAWS RESTRICTING THE PRESS' AccEss TO THE
JUVENILE COURTS
Access to juvenile courts varies from state to state. 3 The majority
of statutes provide that the judge has the discretion to admit the public
into juvenile proceedings. 4 These proceedings are usually closed un-
less there is evidence that an outside party has a "direct" or "proper"
interest in the case.' 5 The court also considers whether opening the
hearing to the public is in the best interest of the child.' 6 If publicity
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY] (suggesting that juvenile delinquents, like
adult offenders, forfeit their right of privacy when they commit a crime).
Nevertheless, juveniles are not deprived of all constitutional protection. In Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966), the Supreme Court held that juveniles have
a right to a fair trial and to due process of law. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text discussing the ramifications of the Kent decision.
13. Access to Juvenile Courts: A Reporter's Guide to Proceedings & Documents (The
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Washington, D.C.), Fall 1991 [hereinafter
Access to Juvenile Courts] (comparing state statutes governing access to juvenile courts).
14. Thirty-nine states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands, grant judges the discretion to exclude the public and the press from
juvenile proceedings.
Traditionally, press access is decided by the juvenile judge on a case-by-case basis.
Unfortunately, this method is inefficient and creates a backlog in the juvenile courts.
The court wastes more time arguing with members of the press than it does in serving
the best interests of the juveniles. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text for a
proposal advocating a uniform approach.
15. Twenty-nine state rules or statutes provide that the court may grant access to
those parties which have a "direct" or "proper" interest in the case. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1986); ARIZ. Juv. CT. R. P. 19; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346
(West 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (Michie 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
28(c) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-41(b) (1992); IDAHO JUV.
R. 22(b) (Michie 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(3) (Michie 1990); LA. CODE
Juv. PROC. ANN. art. 69 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (Law.
Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (West 1992); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 211.171(5) (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.193(1) (Michie 1991); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 741(b) (Mckinney 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (Michie 1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) (Page 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § ll11(A)(1) (West
1987 & Supp. 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6336(d) (Purdon 1982); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 34, § 2208 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-30 (Michie 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
7-755 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.08 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33 (Michie 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(c) (1991);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2517(0 (Butterworth Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.110 (West 1991); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1(d) (1992); WIs. STAT. § 48.299(l)(a)
(West 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-224(b) (1992).
A majority of courts grant access to members of the press because most newspapers
have a legitimate and proper interest in keeping their readers informed about important
issues developing within the law. Access to Juvenile Courts, supra note 13, at 2.
16. Five states hold closed hearings if the judge finds it is in the best interest of the
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has an adverse effect on the minor, the judge may grant a closure order
to keep the press out of the courtroom. Closure orders, however, are
highly scrutinized. The judge's decision must be supported by a signifi-
cant amount of evidence that the juvenile would suffer if access were
granted. 17
A few states have granted access to juvenile proceedings based on
the seriousness of the charged offense."8 Under these laws, delinquents
charged with crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, or aggra-
vated assault are subject to the same treatment as that of an adult crim-
inal. There is a legitimate public interest in the "proper disposition" of
these crimes, regardless of whether the offender is a juvenile or an
adult. '9
Finally, four jurisdictions expressly grant access to the news media
child or community. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070(a) (1992); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-106(2) (West 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-10(b) (Burns 1985); IowA
CODE § 232.39 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4A-60(g) (West
1987). For an overview of changes in the laws for juvenile court access since 1983, see
also Note, supra note 8, at 1540-46.
17. Ex parte Columbia Newspapers, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 337, 338 (S.C. 1985). In Co-
lumbia Newspapers, the court held that the judge's decision to close the transfer hearing
of two 15-year old brothers charged with the murder of their mother must be "sup-
ported by findings which explain the balancing of interests and the need for closure of
the proceeding." Id. See also San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior
Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the court must recog-
nize the importance of confidentiality in the juvenile court as well as the values of open
court proceedings); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990) (noting that because
juvenile court proceedings are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed, the
court needs to weigh the competing interests for and against public access), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 386 (1990); Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577, 579 (S.D. 1987)
(holding that if access is a qualified right, the court must balance the First Amendment
rights of the public and press together with the state's desire to protect the delinquent's
anonymity and the juvenile's right to a fair trial).
18. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp.
1992) (stating that except when a child is charged with first or second degree murder,
the court shall exclude the general public, unless they have a direct interest in the case);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33 (Michie 1992) (providing expressly for media access at
judge's discretion if the crime would be considered a felony when committed by an
adult). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 972(a) (Michie 1975) (mandating that "pro-
ceedings in a crime classified as a felony shall be open to the public"); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 3307(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1993) (forbidding the exclusion of the pub-
lic from proceedings involving serious crimes); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(1) (West
1992) (allowing for open hearings when it is alleged that a child has committed an
offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-
521(5) (1986) (same).
19. News Group Boston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 568 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Mass.
1991). See supra note 12 for a discussion of the two types of juvenile proceedings.
1993]
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in juvenile courts, yet prohibit any person from disclosing information
that identifies the minor or the minor's family.2 ° Each of the above-
mentioned statutes compromise the press' freedom of speech. This
Note analyzes whether these statutes act as a prior restraint or a viable
solution to the conflict between First Amendment rights of access on
the one hand and the need for privacy within the juvenile courts on the
other.
II. KEEPING THE PRESS OUT OF THE JUVENILE COURTROOM:
THE COURT'S REASONS AND CONCERNS
A. Introduction
Legislation restricting access to the juvenile courts is often ambigu-
ous and misleading.21 As previously mentioned, the majority of stat-
utes provide that persons with a direct or proper interest have a right
of access to juvenile proceedings. Yet, how does the legislature define
"direct" or "proper"? Does the press fall within this inclusion? In
each state, juvenile courts have answered these questions differently.
The courts' analyses generally focus on three basic criteria: maintain-
ing the structure and confidentiality of the juvenile courts; analyzing
the history of First Amendment access to courtrooms; and balancing
the interests of the press and the minors involved.22 In order to under-
stand why certain restrictions placed on the press are accepted by the
courts, it is necessary to explore each of these concerns.
B. Philosophy Behind the Juvenile Justice System
The American juvenile court system has its roots in England's Chan-
cery Courts, which were established to protect and supervise delin-
20. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1993) (allowing court to admit press on the
condition that the press does not divulge the minor's identity); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2316(e) (1992) (giving courts discretion to admit the press but the press cannot disclose
minor's identity); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-5(6) (1992) (giving the court discre-
tion to prevent the press from disclosing the minor's identity); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 2517(0 (1992) (giving the court discretion to admit persons contingent on nondisclo-
sure of the child's identity).
21. By relying on unclear terminology, juvenile judges implement overbroad protec-
tive orders during proceedings. In many instances, the protective orders go well beyond
what is authorized by the statute. See, eg., In re M.B., 484 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (finding the trial court's order overbroad).
22. See San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 332, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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quent children.23 Children accused of serious criminal acts, however,
did not fall within the Court's defined jurisdiction.24 Juvenile delin-
quents were placed with other criminals and tried as adults.25 Early
reform movements of the nineteenth century sought ways to change
the system so that children would not consort with adult criminals and
be subject to their penalties and lifestyles.26 This new court system
sought to rehabilitate rather than punish the delinquent minors for
their committed wrongs.27
In order to achieve this goal, the juvenile court restructured itself
into an informal, nonadversarial system.2" Hearings were considered
23. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 12, at 11 (citing ED-
WARD ELDEFONSO, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER (3d ed.
1978)). For an in-depth discussion of the origins of the juvenile court system, see Jonas,
supra note 8, at 288.
24. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 12, at 11.
25. Id. See also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Rnv. 104, 106
(1909). Instead of rehabilitating these children, the system reinforced a negative envi-
ronment and permitted them to become outlaws. Id. at 107. "It criminalized them by
the very methods it used in dealing with them." Id.
26. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). Reformers believed it was society's duty
to play a parental role in order to help rehabilitate delinquents, rather than subject them
to the harshness of substantive and procedural criminal law. Id. In the nineteenth
century, reformers visioned a separate juvenile court system to deal with offenders in a
"more humane, less criminal and presumably more effective manner.. . ." CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 12, at 11. These early reformers considered
the minor child to be inherently good and believed that society should "treat" and "re-
habilitate" delinquents in a non-institutionalized environment. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
16. See generally Jonas, supra note 8, at 288 (discussing the origins of the juvenile court
system).
27. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 12, at 12-15; Mack,
supra note 25, at 107. "The juvenile court is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objec-
tives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation ... not to fix criminal
responsibility, guilt and punishment." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
For a thorough discussion of the rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile courts, see
Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 282-
320 (1967).
28. To fulfill the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court, traditional adversarial
proceedings were eliminated. San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior
Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26-
27).
The state took the role of parens patriae to help those children who could not help
themselves. It became the state's responsibility to be the "ultimate guardian"; to place
the child under its wing, "not as an enemy, but as a protector." Mack, supra note 25, at
107. See also BAILEY & ROTHBLATT, supra note 12, at 4-5 (describing the juvenile
court's early role as parens patriae).
1993]
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"civil" instead of "criminal"; findings and decisions were made without
following normal criminal procedural rules.2 9 In this new atmosphere,
proponents hoped that reformed child offenders would enter adulthood
free of the stigma of being a "former delinquent."30
Although several of the original Juvenile Court Acts3" did not re-
quire closed proceedings, over time, advocates of the Acts insisted on
confidentiality within the system.3 2 Many courts believe that publicity
interferes with the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents.33 Public hear-
ings have the potential to create negative publicity and take away from
29. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5 (1971) (quoting from a
task force report and describing the underlying theories of the juvenile court system).
30. Note, supra note 27, at 282. The purposes of the juvenile justice reform include:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to save
it from a brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take it in hand
and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from the
stigma.
Mack, supra note 25, at 109.
31. The first separate and independent juvenile court system was adopted in 1899 by
the State of Illinois. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). This Act created a unique
courtroom that reviewed cases involving all juveniles, those charged with minor
truancies as well as those suspected of crimes "which would be criminal if done by an
adult." CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 12, at 12. See also Geis,
supra note 8, at 103-05.
Today, all fifty states have their own Juvenile Justice Acts, which mandate separate
courts for juvenile and adult crimes. See supra notes 14-16 and 18-20 and accompany-
ing text for a summary of these Acts.
32. Geis, supra note 8, at 103-05. Historically, states have shielded the public from
juvenile proceedings. San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior
Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125,
1127 (1981)). "The Juvenile Court Law's purpose is to protectively rehabilitate
juveniles and that the maintenance [sic] of confidentiality is a necessary corollary of that
purpose." Id. at 339 (quoting Wescott v. County of Yuba, 163 Cal. Rptr. 385 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980)). See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979)
(noting that almost every state has adopted a shield law providing for confidentiality in
the juvenile courts); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (declaring that states
have a compelling interest in preserving the anonymity of a juvenile delinquent); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (noting that historically, statutes shield juve-
nile offenders from publicity); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (1981) (stating that there
is no absolute right of access to juvenile hearings, which traditionally have been closed).
33. See Geis, supra note 8, at 102 ("Publicity has consistently been regarded as one
of the taboos of juvenile court procedure, devoutly to be avoided."). Embarrassment,
emotional trauma, and stress caused by open hearings directly interfere with the goals
of rehabilitation. San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 340. See also Daily Mail, 443 U.S.
at 107-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Publication of the names of juvenile offenders
may seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and handicap
the youths' prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance by the public.") (quoting
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the system's informal atmosphere.34 Moreover, courts have a responsi-
bility to protect minors and their families from any emotional or physi-
cal harm.35 If a juvenile has committed a serious crime, it is possible
that publicity could jeopardize any opportunity for a fair trial. 6 These
philosophies have been criticized widely as more and more faults and
misperceptions surface concerning the juvenile justice system.37
EDWARD ELDEFONSO, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER 166 (3d
ed. 1978)).
The Supreme Court of Ohio succinctly summarized the dangers of an open juvenile
courtroom: "When the evidence presented at a juvenile hearing is given wide coverage
in the press, the effectiveness of the confidential records statutes and rules is weakened.
Public access has the potential to endanger the fairness of the proceeding or disrupt the
orderly process of adjudication." In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990).
34. San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Note, supra note 27, at 285. Pioneers of
the juvenile courts hoped to avoid "the adult system's reliance on publicity as a deter-
rent" and aimed for a inherently rehabilitative system. Id. at 286.
35. In re M.B., 484 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (IUI. App. Ct. 1985). Intense publicity may
psychologically harm the minor, "making it more difficult, if not impossible, for the
child to recover from those events." In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451. See also In re a
Minor, 537 N.E.2d 292, 294 (Ill. 1989) (noting that the trial court closed juvenile pro-
ceedings to protect the juvenile offender from physical threats).
36. For example, in a recent decision by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
the court held that the press should be excluded from a juvenile proceeding if there is no
reasonable assurance that the juvenile's name will remain confidential. In re J.D.C.,
594 A.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In re J.D.C. involved a fatal shooting of one teenager
by another. Id. at 72. Several days before the trial, the Wall Street Journal identified
the defendant by name and stated that the defendant had shot his friend. Id. The
defendant filed a motion to exclude all members of the media, explaining that any fur-
ther publicity would severely impair his reputation in the community. Id The District
of Columbia statute grants the press access to juvenile proceedings under the condition
that they refrain from disclosing the minor's identity. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e)
(1992). Relying on this statute, the juvenile judge denied the motion to exclude all
representatives of the media from the courtroom. 594 A.2d at 72. It did, however, deny
access to the Wall Street Journal for publicly disclosing the juvenile's name before the
trial. Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed this order and concluded
that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight "to the underlying policy of the stat-
ute." Id. at 77. The court found that "fidelity to the statutory scheme requires [the
court] to hold that the [minor's] right to anonymity trumps the media's interest in at-
tending and reporting on proceedings in a specific juvenile case." Id.
The court also has a responsibility to protect minor witnesses and juveniles involved
in dependency and adoption hearings from adverse publicity. Confidentiality is even
more necessary in proceedings involving abused, dependent, or neglected children. See
In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 449 ("The delinquent child is at least partially responsible for
the case being in court; an abused, neglected or dependent child is wholly innocent of
wrongdoing."). But see In re a Minor, 537 N.E.2d at 302 (holding that the judge must
have more than "vague intimations" that the juvenile offender is in danger, or any re-
striction on the press is not warranted).
37. Confidentiality within the juvenile courts is an effective way to promote the re-
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C. Problems with the Juvenile Court System
In theory, the goals of the juvenile court system appear attainable.
In practice, however, their achievement is hindered by real life obsta-
cles.38 First, the system is not always fair to the juvenile. Due to the
nonadversarial, noncriminal nature of juvenile proceedings, there is no
requirement that juvenile courts follow any formal procedures. 39 As a
result, juveniles often are denied due process of law.' For example, it
was not until 1966, in Kent v. United States, 41 that the Supreme Court
expressly afforded minors the right to representation by counsel during
certain proceedings.4 2 The Kent Court held that neither the court nor
the state could deprive a juvenile of the basic requirements of due pro-
habilitative process and minimize the stigmas that attach to a finding of delinquency.
Note, supra note 27, at 282. However, some critics claim that confidentiality harms the
system, while open proceedings help maintain and enforce the goals of the court. See,
eg., Note, supra note 8, at 1550.
38. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534 (1971) ('There has been
praise for the system and its purposes, and there has been alarm over its defects.").
39. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ('There is evidence, in fact,
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regen-
erative treatment postulated for children.").
40. The juvenile courts overlook the fact that juvenile delinquents are still being
tried for a committed wrong. An "informal" proceeding does not give the court the
right to abuse its power at the expense of the juvenile.
The court in In re Gault, noted that the three most important elements of due process
are (1) a court with jurisdiction; (2) proper notice to parties; and (3) a fair hearing. In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19 n.25 (1967) (quoting Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Foreword to VIR-
TUE, BASIC STRUCTURE FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES IN MICHIGAN at x (1953)). In
order to treat the child as a human being, instead of as chattel, juveniles must be af-
forded all three. Id.
41. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
42. Id. at 561-63. In Kent, a 16 year-old was charged with rape, robbery, and
housebreaking. Id at 543. The juvenile court waived its exclusive jurisdiction without
conducting an investigation. Id at 546. The case was tried in the district court, where
the jury found the juvenile "not guilty by reason of insanity" on the rape count and
guilty of the six counts of housebreaking and robbery. Id. at 550. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court held that the waiver of jurisdiction was invalid because it deprived the
petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and the assistance of counsel. In-
stead, a juvenile is entitled to a hearing, to access by counsel to social records and
probation reports, and to a statement of the reasons for waiving jurisdiction. Id. at 557-
63. However, because juvenile proceedings are "civil" and not criminal trials, juveniles
are not afforded certain protections available in criminal cases. Id. at 555. See also
infra note 45 and accompanying text for discussion of the rights to which juveniles are
not entitled.
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cess and fairness. 3 Five years later in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania," the
Court took a step back from its earlier position and held that the Con-
stitution did not entitle those tried in juvenile court to a jury trial. 5
Although this holding attempts to cast juvenile proceedings as more
rehabilitative than adversarial, those convicted of serious crimes may
be subject to a less fair trial than if they were convicted in a criminal
court.
Second, the juvenile court system has not successfully rehabilitated
juvenile delinquents.46 Critics suggest that the rehabilitative goal of
the courts will work only if those offenders capable of rehabilitation
remain in the system. 7 Yet the number of juvenile delinquents who
have committed violent criminal acts48 has increased gradually within
in the last decade.49 These statistics show that the current rehabilita-
tion process is unsuccessful because delinquents are not deterred from
committing crimes. Moreover, the confidentiality rule has not stopped
employers from gaining access to juvenile records and using that infor-
mation to bar delinquents from future employment.50 Consequently,
43. Kent, 383 U.S. at 560-63.
44. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
45. Id. at 545. Due to the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile hearing, the Court
found it unnecessary to treat it similarly to a criminal trial. Id. at 545-47. The Court
concluded that not all rights granted to adults should be afforded to juveniles. Id. at
545. Juveniles are not entitled to bail, a speedy and public trial, indictment by a grand
jury, immunity against self-incrimination, or confrontation of their accusers. Kent, 383
U.S. at 555.
46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967) (noting the recidivism rate among
juveniles). See also CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 12, at 18-19
(noting the increased juvenile crime rate).
47. Note, supra note 27, at 283 ("[T]he rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court
system can be fulfilled only if the scope of the regime is limited to those offenders who
are capable of rehabilitation.").
48. This Note defines violent criminal acts as murder, non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
49. Although juvenile arrest rates for overall reported offenses declined between
1979 and 1989, the arrest rates for violent criminal acts increased 16% between 1985
and 1989. IRA M. SCHWARTZ ET AL., CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH POLICY,
UNIV. OF MICH. SCH. OF SOCIAL WORK, JUVENILE ARREST, DETENTION AND INCAR-
CERATION TRENDS: 1979-1989, at 3 (1991). The arrest rates for some property offenses
and other delinquent offenses increased 1 I% between 1983 and 1989. Id.
50. Both private and governmental employers are able to obtain police and court
reports if they are interested in an applicant's juvenile court contacts. Note, supra note
8, at 1558. See also Douglas E. Mirell & David C. Fainer, Jr., Comment, Delinquency
Hearings and the First Amendment: Reassessing Juvenile Court Confidentiality Upon the
Demise of "Conditional Access," 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 123, 156-57 (1979) ("Those
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the stigma associated with juvenile delinquency remains with juvenile
offenders for most of their lives.51
Finally, the system is often unfair to the general public. The public,
as well as members of the press, play an important role in courtroom
proceedings. 2 In an open courtroom, reporters can act as the eyes and
ears of the general public. By closing the doors to juvenile proceedings,
the public is unable to discover and perhaps solve the problems within
the system. 3 This lack of access arguably hurts juveniles in custody.
Public access has the potential to play a positive role in the juvenile
courts by serving many of the social values recognized in the context of
criminal trials. 4 Both the public and the press can help to discourage
perjury,55 assist with more accurate fact-finding,5 6 and check judicial
interested in the background of the juvenile.., seek out cumulative records of individ-
ual's past conduct, rather than specific, isolated news reports."). But cf Note, supra
note 8, at 1558 ("Potential employers, moreover, probably do not screen old newspaper
files to determine the criminal record of a youthful applicant .... Thus, public access
to juvenile delinquency hearings may contribute minimally, if at all, to the juvenile's...
loss of occupational and educational opportunities.").
Moreover, it is society's duty to warn employers and educators who hire delinquents
that certain juveniles may be dangerous or violent. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMA-
TION POLICY, supra note 12, at 111-12. See also In re B.C.L., 413 A.2d 335, 343 (N.J.
1980) ("The gravity of the offense can also be a sufficient warrant for disclosure ....
Implicit in the public's recognized right to be informed is its ability to have the informa-
tion necessary for its security.").
51. Society associates the term "delinquent" with "criminal." The stigma will
plague juvenile offenders regardless of whether their hearings remain confidential.
52. "[IThe United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the salutary
function served by the press in encouraging the fairness of trials and subjecting the
administration of justice to the beneficial effects of public scrutiny." Brian W. v. Supe-
rior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 792 (Cal. 1978) (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
53. "Public access serves an important educative function." San Bernardino County
Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 342 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). Access can lead to informed public discussion about the problems and issues
surrounding the juvenile courts. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990). See also
In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1989) ("[P]ublic awareness and understanding of
the juvenile court system ... would promote public involvement in the governmental
processes and might deter inappropriate actions on the part of some participants.").
54. San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 341. The San Bernardino court noted that
access to trials is no less compelling in a juvenile court. "The public's ability to under-
stand how the system operates and, in turn, its ability to make informed decisions re-
garding the need for positive changes to the system will be enhanced by allowing access
to the proceedings." Id. at 342 (citing In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 849).
55. See id. at 341; In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 450; In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 849.
56. "[P]ublic scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the
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abuse.5 7 The public therefore has a legitimate interest in scrutinizing
the work of the juvenile courts. 8
D. Whether a First Amendment Right of Access Should Extend to
Juvenile Court Proceedings
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that the "Freedom of
Press" Clause of the First Amendment 9 gives the media a constitu-
tional right of access to government-controlled, newsworthy informa-
tion." A purpose of the First Amendment is to arouse open discussion
of governmental affairs;61 a democracy requires all citizens to have an
opportunity to participate in "our republican system of self-govern-
ment."" Therefore, rules which infringe upon the press' right of ac-
cess must be scrutinized carefully and balanced against any conflicting
state interests.
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has maintained that there is a consti-
tutional right of access to criminal court proceedings.63 In an adult
criminal trial there is a presumption of openness;" any publicity sur-
integrity of the fact finding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as
a whole." In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d at 846 (quoting Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)).
57. San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 341. Public scrutiny discourages biased and
secret decisions and any misconduct among participants. See Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980). See also Note, supra note 8, at 1550-52 & nn.58-70
for an in-depth discussion on potential abuses of the system by public officials.
58. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 450. Open trials assist the general public in under-
standing and appreciating the American legal system. San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 336-37 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572). See also Brian W. v. Supe-
rior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 790-91 (Cal. 1978) (suggesting that juvenile courts should
actively encourage greater participation by the press).
59. The First Amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982).
61. Id. at 604 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
62. Id.
63. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) was the first case
in which the United States Supreme Court held that the press had a First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials. Id. at 558.
64. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71. In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger
noted that both civil and criminal trials historically have been open to the public. Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17. But see Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 611
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[N]either Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision
today [carries] any implications outside the context of criminal trials.").
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rounding these proceedings is expected and demanded by society. 65
The Supreme Court upheld this presumption in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia.66 The Court looked to uncontradicted history and
concluded that the press serves as a check on the fact-finding process
and enhances the judicial system's integrity and quality.67 However,
this constitutional right is not absolute.68 It is within the court's dis-
cretion to exclude members of the press and the public from a trial if
their inclusion impairs fairness of the proceeding or infringes upon the
defendant's constitutional rights.69
The right to deny access to the public is subject to a strict scrutiny
65. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570. This presumption goes back to the
English legal system, where courts emphasized the importance of public participation
and attendance at public criminal trials. Id at 565-66. The public character of criminal
trials has remained constant. Id. at 567. The "presumptive openness" is a necessary
part of a trial because it promotes justice. Id Moreover, open access ensures citizens
the opportunity to remain informed about everyday governmental affairs. Globe News-
paper, 457 U.S. at 604 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). See infra
note 67 and accompanying text explaining the importance of open proceedings.
66. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
67. Id. at 569-71. Furthermore, public access creates an image of fairness within
the court and raises public respect for the judicial process. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S.
at 606. See also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-71 (noting that public trials
provide an "outlet" for natural public reactions of outrage); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 428-29 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(commenting on the role of fairness in open trials); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S.
610, 616 (1960) (noting that the public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment reflects
the common law tradition ofjustice.); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-71 (1948) (noting
the common law distrust of secret trials).
68. See San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283
Cal. Rptr. 332, 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "the right of access does not
extend automatically to every proceeding in court"); Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410
N.W.2d 577, 578 (S.D. 1987) (noting that "the Media has no absolute constitutional
right of access to any phase of a criminal trial"). Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (commenting that the Supreme Court has often denied that
First Amendment rights are absolute); In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1989)
(holding that "[tihe right of public and press access is not absolute .... and may be
denied if it is 'shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental inter-
est, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest' ") (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 606-07).
69. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81. See also Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that neither the public nor the press has a constitu-
tional right of access to pretrial proceedings if the court agrees to closure in order to
assure defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (emphasizing that a judge has an affirmative duty to prevent ad-
verse publicity from endangering defendant's ability to receive a fair trial). But see
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (holding that although
the right of the accused to a fair trial is crucial, it is difficult to distinguish his or her
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analysis."0 Applying this standard, the Court in Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court 7 struck down a Massachusetts statute that excluded
the public from the courtroom when a minor was the victim of a sex
crime." The Court held that the state's interest in protecting the juve-
nile's physical and psychological demeanor was not compelling enough
to justify a blanket exclusionary rule.7"
In dissent, then Chief Justice Burger criticized the majority's deci-
sion for overlooking the significant number of state statutes that afford
juvenile delinquents protection against publicity.74 Ironically, the ma-
jority's opinion contradicted current trends in juvenile statutory law.7"
Nevertheless, this decision laid the foundation for a new constitutional
right of access to the press.
The Supreme Court extended Richmond's and Globe's "presumption
of openness" rationale in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia (Press-Enterprise ),76 finding that the press has a constitutional
right to attend the jury selection process in criminal trials.77 In Press-
interests from "the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which
promotes fairness").
The Court in Richmond Newspapers noted that legitimate restrictions include those to
ensure a quiet and orderly setting, as well as restrictions limiting capacity or access.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
70. Under strict scrutiny, the state must show that limitations on the press' right to
disseminate information serve" 'a compelling governmental interest,' and are narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
71. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
72. Id at 602. In Globe Newspaper, the state argued that it had a compelling inter-
est in protecting the victims of sex crimes from further psychological damage and in
encouraging victims to report and testify in court about these crimes. Id. at 607. In
order to satisfy these interests, the state asserted that it was necessary to deny access to
the press and the public during the testimony of the minor. Id.
73. Id at 608-10. The Court held that other alternative means could prove equally
effective for protecting the state's interest. For example, the court could use a case-by-
case approach to determine whether public proceedings would harm the minor victim.
Id. at 608. Closure could be based on a list of criteria such as the minor victim's age,
the nature of the crime, whether the victim and his or her family wish to keep the
proceedings closed, and the level of the victim's maturity. Id. This type of court discre-
tion guarantees the press and the public that their First Amendment right of access will
be protected except when the state's justification "is a weighty one." Id.
74. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text for illustrative statutes protecting
juveniles.
76. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
77. Id. at 508 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71
(1980)).
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Enterprise I, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision prohibiting the press from viewing the voir dire for a trial in-
volving the rape and murder of a teenage girl.7" The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that an open trial is essential for the appearance of a
fair trial.7 9 Because secret proceedings tend to make the public and the
press lose confidence in the system, 0 the Court opined that the public
has a legitimate interest in knowing what happens to persons accused
of criminal acts, especially violent crimes.8"
Two years later, the Supreme Court held in Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise 11)82 that the First
Amendment right of access extended to preliminary hearings.8 3 The
78. Id. at 505. The trial judge supported the state's assertion that potential jurors
would "lack the candor necessary to assure a fair trial" if the press was present during
voir dire. Id. at 503.
79. Id. at 505. "The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually at-
tending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are
being followed and that deviations will become known." Id. at 508 (citing Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-71).
80. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509 ("Closed proceedings, although not abso-
lutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of
openness."); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 ("People in an open society do not
demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing.").
81. Id. at 508-09. The Court noted:
Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern [and] out-
rage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire
to have justice done.... When the public is aware that the law is being enforced
and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these under-
standable reactions and emotions.
Id.
82. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
83. Id. at 10. In Press-Enterprise II, the State of California accused nurse Robert
Diez of murdering twelve of his patients. Id. at 3. The state alleged that Diez adminis-
tered massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine, which caused a fatal reaction. Id. Con-
sistent with California Penal Code § 868, the magistrate granted the defendant's motion
to exclude the public from the preliminary hearing. Id. at 3-4. The case attracted
national attention, so the court believed exclusion to be necessary in order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. Id at 4. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the state moved to release the transcript of the preliminary hearing to the public. Id. at
4-5. The Superior Court denied the motion, stating that public dissemination of the
transcript "might prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. at 5. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, noting that while the public had no general
constitutional right of access, the court could close the hearing when there is a reason-
able likelihood of substantial prejudice. Id. at 5-6. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that the public has a First Amendment right of access to prelimi-
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Court based its decision on two complementary considerations: experi-
ence and logic.84 First, the Court considered whether preliminary
hearings were historically open to the press and general public.85 Sec-
ond, the Court questioned whether public access plays a significant and
positive role in the process. 86 The Court concluded that the press had
a First Amendment right of access if the proceeding in question passed
this test of "experience and logic."8' However, the Court emphasized
once again that this right is not unconditional. 8 In limited circum-
stances, the press' First Amendment right can be outweighed by an-
other constitutional guarantee.8 9 To overcome the "presumption of
openness," the court must show that closure is essential and that it is
narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest."
Because the Supreme Court has not extended this right outside the
context of criminal trials, lower courts are left unguided as to whether
there is a qualified right of access to juvenile proceedings.91 Courts are
split on the issue even though all attempt to apply the standards set
forth in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny.92 Hearings in juvenile
nary hearings and that this fundamental interest "cannot be overcome by the con-
clusory assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant" of a fair trial. Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 8-9. This formula is based on a compilation of the Court's previous deci-
sions in Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and Press-Enterprise I. Id.
85. Id. at 8. The Court found that there was a tradition of accessibility to prelimi-
nary hearings in California. Id. at 10. Trial by jury is a presumptively public process;
closure is warranted only if the court can show good cause. Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 8-9. The Court found that the openness of certain trials supports "public
confidence" in the system. Id. Just as public access to criminal trials and jury selection
ensure the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, so does access to prelimi-
nary hearings. Id. at 12.
87. Press-Enterprise 1I, 478 U.S. at 9.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court acknowledged that the right of the accused to a fair trial may
outweigh the right of access. Id. See infra note 104 and accompanying text for cases
upholding prior restraints.
90. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14. The Supreme Court has rejected several
interests as "non-compelling" and, therefore, insufficient to justify an infringement on
First Amendment rights. See Worrell Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739
F.2d 1219, 1223 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984) (listing cases and identifying the interests found to
be not compelling).
91. See supra note 2 for an illustration of state cases which have addressed access to
juvenile proceedings.
92. The standard is clearly set out in San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social
Servs. v. Superior Court:
(I) the right of access does not extend automatically to every proceeding in
court; (2) whether the right extends to a particular proceeding depends on whether
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courts are not traditionally open to the public and the press.93 The
historically private nature of juvenile proceedings distinguishes them
from traditional criminal trials.94 However, public access to juvenile
proceedings plays a significantly positive role by promoting public sup-
port and ensuring fairness within the system. 95 Until the Supreme
Court addresses this issue specifically, the degree to which courts can
restrict access to juvenile proceedings remains unclear.
III. STATUTES WHICH GRANT THE PRESS ACCESS BUT PLACE
SPEECH-RELATED RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT IT CAN
DISSEMINATE AND PUBLISH
If the press has no constitutional right to attend juvenile proceed-
ings, a court's decision to restrict access is subject to a lesser standard
of review. 96 Under such a standard, juvenile laws may be as restrictive
as necessary to protect the interests of the state.9 7 A few state statutes
close all juvenile proceedings to the public,9" while others grant the
the particular proceeding passes the tests of experience and logic (Press-Enterprise
II); (3) if the right does apply to a particular proceeding, a statute mandating that
such proceeding be closed is unconstitutional (Globe); and finally; (4) if there is a
constitutional right of access to a particular proceeding, any order closing all or
part of that proceeding must be supported by articulated findings indicating that
closure is necessary to serve an overriding and compelling state interest and that
the order closing the proceedings is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
93. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text discussing the history of confiden-
tiality within the juvenile court.
94. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment
of juvenile delinquents. See also notes 63-81 and accompanying text discussing the pre-
sumptive openness of criminal trials.
95. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (not-
ing that "where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome
can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been cor-
rupted"). See also supra note 67 for discussion of the advantages of open proceedings.
96. The California Court of Appeals faced this issue in San Bernardino, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 334. The court held that if there is a constitutional public right of access then
the court cannot exclude the public unless the state can show an overriding compelling
interest for closure and that the exclusion is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id.
at 336 n.4. However, if there is no constitutional right at issue, the court does not need
to balance the press' First Amendment rights against the state's interests. Id.
97. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale
behind restrictive juvenile laws.
98. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:34 (1991) (allowing only parties, wit-
nesses, and counsel to attend); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-302 (Michie 1992) (excluding the
general public from all juvenile court hearings).
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press access but prohibit any dissemination of information that identi-
fies the minor or the minor's family.99 The latter restrictions serve as a
reasonable assurance that the primary goal of protecting a minor's ano-
nymity will be achieved."°° When a state places speech-related restric-
tions on the press, however, it creates a prior restraint."0° Prior
restraints are not unconstitutional per se,102 but must be supported by
a very important state interest in order to be valid.1 3 Except in special
circumstances,10 4 the state does not have the power to prohibit the
publication of information that has been publicly revealed and obtained
through lawful means. °5 Prior restraints on speech are the most seri-
ous infringements on First Amendment rights." 6
Prior restraints and criminal sanctions are viewed similarly in the
eyes of the Supreme Court in that they are both presumptively uncon-
stitutional."0 7 Since 1976, the Court has consistently held that a state
99. See supra note 20 for an enumeration of these statutes.
100. See, eg., In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting the legisla-
ture's paramount aim of protecting the juvenile's anonymity).
101. See In re a Minor, 537 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) (noting the suspect nature of
prior restraints because "a prior restraint freezes the flow of ideas during the course of
litigation and tends to deprive the public of timely news, information and comment").
102. Id. See infra note 107 and accompanying text noting that prior restraints are
presumptively invalid.
103. See Worrell Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1222
(7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the state's interest must be compelling and pursued through
the least restrictive means); San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 638 P.2d 655,
662 n.12 (Cal. 1982) ("Normally a statute that directly affects protected speech or press
rights cannot be upheld against a challenge... unless the law is necessary to accomplish
a compelling state interest unrelated to speech and no means of serving that interest,
less intrusive on speech, is available."). See generally Jonas, supra note 8, at 317-29
(analyzing First Amendment prior restraint doctrine as applied to juvenile court
proceedings).
104. The Supreme Court has upheld prior restraints only in exceptional circum-
stances. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The immunity from prior re-
straints is limited to contexts where necessary to protect the national security, to protect
against acts of violence or a forceful overthrow of government, or to prevent the publi-
cation of obscenity. Id.
105. See In re a Minor, 537 N.E.2d at 301. See also State v. Stauffer Communica-
tions, Inc., 592 P.2d 891, 895 (Kan. 1979) (noting that the press has undeniable access
to information once it is placed into the public domain); Edward A. Sherman Publish-
ing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1256 (R.I. 1982) (holding that a statute cannot bar
the press from reporting a juvenile's identity once this information is revealed outside of
the juvenile court).
106. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
107. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (stating
that prior restraints on expression carry a "heavy presumption" of unconstitutionality).
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may not impose sanctions on the truthful disclosure of information in-
volving public judicial proceedings.10 8 As long as the information is on
public record, the state cannot prohibit the press from divulging and
publishing its findings. 1°" This rationale also applies to privileged in-
formation obtained during juvenile proceedings." 0 Nevertheless, legis-
latures and state courts continue to uphold statutes that restrain the
press from disclosing a juvenile's identity." 1
The Constitutionality of Restrictions Placed on the Press Once Inside
the Courtroom: Two Distinct Views
Supporters of the media argue that juvenile courts may not restrain
108. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). In Cox, the
Court declared unconstitutional a statute that made it a crime to publish the name of a
rape victim. Id at 496-97. The Court reasoned: "By placing the information in the
public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded
that the public interest was thereby served... States may not impose sanctions on the
publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public
inspection." Id. at 495. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), Justice Douglas made
a very strong argument against punishing the media for their reporting of courtroom
proceedings:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property....
Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity. There is no
special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other
institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which
transpire in proceedings before it.
Id. at 374. See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838
(1978) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute making it a crime to publish informa-
tion regarding confidential proceedings before a state judicial review commission, be-
cause such reporting is protected under the First Amendment).
109. Cox, 420 U.S. at 492. The privacy interests of the accused decrease once infor-
mation appears on public record, while the First Amendment interest of the public and
the press remains constant. Id. at 494. Accordingly, the Cox Court held that the First
Amendment protects the press when it publishes truthful information open to public
inspection. Id at 495. See supra note 108 for the Court's reasoning.
110. In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 309 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that if juvenile hearings are open to the public, even if they are
normally closed, the state cannot bar the press from publishing truthful information
obtained at the hearing. Id. at 311. Once information is placed in the public domain,
the court cannot constitutionally restrain its publication or dissemination. Id. at 310.
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979), the Court invalidated
a West Virginia statute prohibiting the press from publishing the identity of a juvenile
delinquent without approval of the juvenile court. The Smith Court held that the stat-
ute operated as a prior restraint on speech and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at
100.
111. As long as the statute is narrowly tailored, courts will not invalidate these
laws. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text discussing such a case.
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the press from disclosing a juvenile's identity once the press is granted
access to the courtroom.112 Although there may not be a constitu-
tional right of access to juvenile proceedings, once the court agrees to
open its doors, any information revealed is by lawful means. 1 3 This
reasoning is consistent with those Supreme Court cases which ban
prior restraints when the targeted information is already in the public
forum. 14 When the judge grants the press access to the courtroom,
the state waives its right to withhold information from the public. The
state can only invoke protective measures if publication would result in
a serious threat to the juvenile's welfare and no other less speech-re-
strictive alternatives are available.1 5
The Supreme Court upheld, however, a prior restraint in Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart.116 In Rhinehart, the Court validated a court
order prohibiting the dissemination, publication, or use of information
obtained during discovery. 17 The respondent, the spiritual leader of a
112. Because the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, there is no concrete
legal standard regarding permissible state regulation of press conduct. Several state
courts have expressly turned down the opportunity to answer this question. See, e.g., In
re Hughes County Action No. Juv 90-3, 452 N.W.2d 128, 134 (S.D. 1990) (refraining
from determining the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited the media from dis-
closing a witness' identity when appearing in a juvenile proceeding); Associated Press v.
Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d 577, 580-81 (S.D. 1987) (same). But see infra notes 134-138
and accompanying text for discussion of a case holding that the press may be prohibited
from releasing information obtained in the courtroom.
113. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976) ("Once a public
hearing has been held, what transpires there [cannot] be subject to prior restraint.").
See also In Interest of a Minor, 563 N.E.2d 1069, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (Steigmann,
J., dissenting) ("Tlhe First Amendment strips the State of the power to proscribe the
publication of information which has already been lawfully revealed and which has been
obtained by lawful means.") (quoting In re a Minor, 537 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Ill. 1989)).
114. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases which
have applied this rationale.
115. See In re a Minor, 537 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989) (noting valid prior re-
straints). Overbroad court orders restricting access and speech will not be sustained.
For example, in In re M.B., 484 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), the Illinois Court of
Appeals invalidated a protective order that placed more restraints on the press' freedom
than the Illinois state statute. Id. at 1159-60. The Court reasoned: "The statute per-
mits only the suppression of the minor's identity. Anything beyond that, and the order
here goes far beyond, is suspect and subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 1159.
116. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
117. Id. at 29. In the State of Washington, a judge may issue a protective order
during the discovery process only if there is a finding of "good cause," as required by
Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(c). Id. at 25-26. The court relied on In re
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979), which stated that "the harm posed by dissemi-
nation must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn
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religious organization,1 18 brought a damages action against several
newspaper companies for defamation and invasion of privacy.1 1 9 Dur-
ing discovery, the petitioners demanded access to the identities of the
members and donors in respondent's congregation.12 ° Although the
district court ordered the respondents to disclose the information, it
also issued a protective order prohibiting petitioners from publicly di-
vulging the identities of the donors. 12 1 The Supreme Court upheld the
protective order, concluding that it did not violate the First
Amendment.
122
The Rhinehart Court applied a two-part test1 23 to determine
whether there is a constitutional right to disseminate information with-
and precise; and there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest
which intrudes less directly on expression." Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 25 n.6 (quoting In
re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 191).
118. Rhinehart is the spiritual leader for the Aquarian Foundation. 467 U.S. at 22.
The common link between the 1,000 member, Washington-based organization is their
belief in life after death. Id. The Aquarians employed Rhinehart as their primary
medium to communicate with the dead. Id
119. The Seattle Times and the Walla Union-Bulletin published eleven articles in
over six years about Rhinehart and his religious practices. Id. Each article created an
allegedly false description of the respondent and his associates. Rhinehart claimed that
the petitioners knew or should have known that the statements were false. Id. at 23.
Rhinehart further alleged that the negative publicity harmed Aquarian's financial status
by discouraging contributions by current members. Id.
120. Rhinehart refused to disclose the identity of Aquarian's members on the
grounds that it would violate its members' "privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of
association." Id. at 25.
121. The trial court found that publicizing the discovery requests could have an
adverse effect on the members and donors and subject them to both personal embarrass-
ment and physical harm. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 26-27. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington affirmed the protective order, stating:
[Although a] protective order may fall... within the definition of a 'prior restraint
of free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of the judiciary in the integ-
rity of its discovery processes is sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justifica-
tion. The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like
[Washington Superior Court Civil Rule] 26(c) which authorizes a trial court to
protect the confidentiality of information given for purposes of litigation.
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 690 (Wash. 1982).
122. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 37.
123. The test is extrapolated from Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
It focuses on whether (1) "the practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and whether (2) "the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to
the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Id.
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out restraints when access is obtained through a court order.124 First,
the Court looked at the history behind the discovery process. Because
the state creates discovery rules, petitioners in civil litigation are privi-
leged with access to their opponent's records. 125 Furthermore, pretrial
depositions and other discovery proceedings rarely take place in pub-
lic. 126 Information revealed through discovery can often be irrelevant
or inadmissible at trial. 127 Also, a court has a right to prohibit the
dissemination of confidential data unrelated to the case if its publicity
would have the potential for abuse.
128
Second, the Court considered whether the restraining order was
overbroad or too intrusive on the petitioners' First Amendment free-
doms. 129  The protective order at issue was limited to information
gained during discovery; it did not restrict the publication of anything
obtained from other outside sources. 3 ° The Court therefore con-
cluded that the protective order was narrowly tailored and that any
infringement was a minor imposition on the petitioners' First Amend-
ment rights.'
3
'
Protective orders in civil discovery proceedings are analogous to the
conditional restrictions issued by juvenile courts. In Rhinehart, the
Court held that access to discovery materials grants a party a condi-
tional right to use the information when preparing for and trying its
case; the party does not have a protected right to release that informa-
124. Id. at 32. The relationship above parallels the situation where a juvenile judge
grants access to the press, yet restrains them from publishing the identification of the
juveniles.
125. "A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made avail-
able only for purposes of trying his suit." Id. at 32. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1965) ('The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information.").
126. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33. See also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
389 (1979) (holding that discovery proceedings are private; the public was not afforded
a right of access under English common law).
127. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33.
128. Id. at 35.
129. Id. at 32, 36-37.
130. Id. at 37.
131. Id. at 34. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has validated speech-re-
lated restraints in order to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 32 n.18 (citing Oklahoma Publish-
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 563 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966)). See also
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 n.21 (1981) ("In the conduct of a case, a court
often finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel,
witnesses, and jurors.").
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tion to the public.13 2 Similarly, conditional access to juvenile proceed-
ings gives the press the right to disseminate newsworthy information
obtained during the proceeding, but there is no constitutionally pro-
tected right of the press to print everything heard in the courtroom. 3'
The Rhinehart rationale was applied to juvenile proceedings in In
the Interest of a Minor.134 In that case, the Illinois Court of Appeals
held that the press may be prohibited from publicizing the minor's
identity if it obtained the information inside the courtroom.135 The
court noted that juvenile proceedings are traditionally closed to all but
the direct parties involved; any access is conditional and based on the
court's discretion. 136  As long as the press is unable to obtain the juve-
nile's identity through regular reportorial techniques, it is within the
court's authority to restrain the press from publishing any privileged
information.137 The court implied that in order to prevent potential
harm to the minor, the press must waive the right to use any informa-
tion obtained contrary to the court's wishes. 1
38
132. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text discussing the Court's
reasoning.
133. If the juvenile court grants access to members of the press based on the condi-
tion that certain information (such as the minor's identity) would not be released, the
press is obligated to live up to its agreement. For example, in In re Steinberg, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District
upheld a prior restraint placed against an employee who signed a secrecy agreement as a
condition of employment. Id. at 617-18. The court held that the right of access was
purely conditional; without the signed contract, the employee would never have had
access to the confidential information sought to be published. IaL at 618.
134. 563 N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
135. Id at 1077. To be admitted into the proceedings, petitioner, the Champaign
News-Gazette, was ordered by the juvenile court to refrain from identifying the two
minor victims of parental physical and sexual abuse. Id at 1071. The Court of Appeals
held that the court's order was overbroad and constituted an impermissible prior re-
straint of the press. Id at 1077. The court concluded, however, that limiting the re-
straint to information regarding the juveniles' identities revealed during the proceeding
was permissible. Id.
136. Id. at 1076-77.
137. Id at 1077. However, the court's order cannot be so overbroad that it re-
strains the press from publicizing information obtained both inside and outside the
courtroom. Id.
138. Id. See also Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 681 (Wash. 1982)
where the court stated:
[W]hen persons are required to give information which they would otherwise be
entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure government benefit or perform an
obligation to that government, those receiving that information waive the right to
use it for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of govern-
ment which exacted the information.
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It is a privilege to gain access to juvenile proceedings. History pro-
vides that there is a presumption of closure to the juvenile courts in
order to protect the identity of minors.139 It is therefore within the
court's discretion to conditionally restrain the press from publishing
information which may be damaging or abusive to the minor or the
minor's family. Releasing the name of a juvenile delinquent is not es-
sential to a well-written and newsworthy story.1'4 This restraint can
be narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate interests of the state as well
as the constitutional rights of the press.
IV. A PROPOSAL THAT WITHSTANDS STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
Until the Supreme Court decides whether there is a constitutional
right of access to juvenile court proceedings, courts will continue to
place unnecessary barriers on the press' freedom of speech. Once ad-
mitted into the juvenile courtroom, the press has an undeniable First
Amendment right to print the truth. Any infringement on this funda-
mental interest must withstand strict scrutiny in order to be upheld.
By granting access to juvenile proceedings, however, the state does not
relinquish its compelling interest in protecting juveniles from unwanted
publicity. Ideally, the court should adopt a policy which grants the
public access to juvenile proceedings yet ensures the offender a fair trial
by protecting him or her from adverse publicity. A uniform approach,
instead of the current policy of case-by-case discretion, is the most effi-
cient solution. 141
The Supreme Court, however, should not advocate an unconditional
Id.
139. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text discussing the traditions of confi-
dentiality within the juvenile courts.
140. Justice Rehnquist's famous concurrence in Smith v. Daily Mail reiterates this
belief: "The press is free to describe the details of the offense and inform the community
of the proceedings against the juvenile. It is difficult to understand how publication of a
youth's name is in any way necessary to performance of the press' 'watchdog' role."
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
141. This proposal does not suggest implementing one Juvenile Justice Act for all
states; it merely suggests that with regard to press access, a more uniform approach
would decrease litigation and help ease the backlog within the juvenile courts. There
are too many cases in juvenile court involving representatives of the media petitioning
against protective or restraining orders. The proposed solution offers a viable alterna-
tive to the case-by-case discretionary approach. See In Interest of a Minor, 563 N.E.2d
1069, 1076 (Iil. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that a case-by-case analysis "causes more
delay in the commencement of proceedings designed to protect minors").
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right of access. The Court should clarify that the public and the press
are entitled to access on two conditions: (1) that they have a direct
interest in the case before the court;142 and (2) that the juvenile of-
fender's identity remains anonymous.143 In addition, conditional ac-
cess should apply to all juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. The
following proposed statute incorporates these elements:
Part I. Juvenile Courtroom Procedures
Subchapter I. Access to Juvenile Courtrooms
§ 101. Rights of Parties to Proceedings
(a) Any persons, including members of the press, who have
a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court, shall
be admitted to the proceeding on the condition that they re-
frain from divulging information identifying the child or
members of the child's family involved in the proceeding,
provided that, no judge shall issue any protective order
preventing members of the press or any other interested party
from publishing or otherwise disclosing information legally
obtained outside the court proceeding. 1"
Adoption of a statute, modeled after the one proposed, would pass
constitutional muster. The proposal is narrowly tailored to meet the
compelling interests of the state. 145 Furthermore, it properly balances
the privacy rights of the juvenile delinquent and the First Amendment
rights of the press.
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text explaining the requirement that the
press have a direct interest in the juvenile adjudicatory proceedings. This limitation on
access guarantees the public an opportunity to observe justice within the juvenile court-
room. Additionally, the court may continue to use its discretion by prohibiting non-
parties from disrupting proceedings.
143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text suggesting that it is unnecessary for
the press to identify minors when reporting cases involving juvenile delinquents.
144. This proposed model is based on the Juvenile Codes of the District of Colum-
bia and Illinois. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
para. 801-5(6) (1992). See supra note 20 for a brief description of these statutes.
145. Several lower courts suggest this approach as a way to satisfy the interests of
all parties. See, eg., Brian W. v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 791 n.6 (Cal. 1978)
(implying that conditional access based on the promise to keep the juvenile's identity
confidential would be constitutional); In re Hughes County Action No. Juv 90-3, 452
N.W.2d 128, 134 (S.D. 1990) (conditional access is a viable "alternative to a totally
closed adjudicative hearing").
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V. CONCLUSION
The policy arguments for keeping juvenile proceedings are laudable.
Juvenile delinquents deserve an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.
Society's goal of remolding juvenile offenders has a greater chance of
success if the crimes are kept confidential. However, confidentiality
does not mean secrecy. It is important for the public to understand
how the juvenile court functions. Moreover, the public has a right to
know about crimes committed by juvenile offenders as well as those
crimes committed against minor victims. Conditional access to juve-
nile proceedings is a viable solution to end the present day conflict of
rights. Conditional access proves beneficial because it does not unnec-
essarily restrict the freedom of the press. Restricted access also enables
the public to receive valuable information, while refraining from upset-
ting the structure of the juvenile court. Access based on the suggested
preconditions serves as a fair compromise for all those involved.
Susan S. Greenebaum*
* J.D. 1993, Washington University.
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